My research focuses on the nature of rational agency, both practical and epistemic. I’m particularly interested in how various epistemic and practical norms govern the exercises of such agency: our believing, intending, and acting. This leads me to address a range of topics in metaethics (reasons, norms, and rationality), epistemology (reasoning, the ethics of belief), and philosophy of mind (the nature of our rational powers).
Lately, I’ve been thinking a lot about the difference between virtue and skill, and how this difference matters for a proper understanding of epistemic and moral achievements (see my papers in PPR and AJP for more on this project).
In addition, I continue working on issues in philosophy of action, which has been the focus of my PhD dissertation (intentional action, practical knowledge).
I started writing and publishing philosophy in German, but these days I mostly do so in English.
Here is my PhilPapers page
“Moral Worth and Skillful Action”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).
“In Defense of Constitutivism About Epistemic Normativity”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2022).
“Is Epistemic Competence a Skill?”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2022).
“How Reasoning Aims at Truth”, Noûs (2021).
“Enkratic Agency”, European Journal of Philosophy (2017).
“Actions and Accidents”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2015).
“Gute Gründe. Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit der realistischen Auffassung von Handlungsgründen”, in: J. Kertscher, J. Müller (eds.), Lebensform und Praxisform (2015).
Some (in retrospect: very premature) reflections on normative reasons.
“Handlungen, Absichten und praktisches Wissen”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie (2013).
“Schwerpunkt: Praktisches Wissen” (co-authored with Andrea Kern), Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie (2013).
A short intro to our special issue. (final version)
“Practical Knowledge”, in: T. Spitzley, M. Holtje, W. Spohn (eds.): What may we believe? What ought we to do? (2013).
On why, if doing something intentionally is doing it knowingly, the knowledge must be practical knowledge (not observational or inferential knowledge).
Absichtliches Handeln, Paderborn: Mentis Verlag. 2012.
In this book (basically my PhD thesis), I offer an account of intentional action in terms of practical knowledge. (book)
“Agency and Rationality” (co-edited with Sergio Tenenbaum), special issue for Manuscrito, 41(4), 2018. (issue)
“Praktisches Wissen” (co-edited with Andrea Kern), special issue for Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 61(3), 2013. (issue)
Work in progress
Please feel free to email me for drafts. Some of these papers are under review, so I have removed their titles.
A paper arguing for a virtue-based account of epistemic rationality.
A paper defending the distinctness of virtue.
A paper on Sosa’s view of competence.
A paper on the relationship between moral and epistemic virtue.