Research
Overview | Papers | Book | Edited volumes | Work in progress
Overview
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My research focuses on the nature of rational agency, both practical and epistemic. I’m particularly interested in how various epistemic and practical norms govern the exercises of such agency: our believing, intending, and acting. This leads me to address a range of topics in metaethics (reasons, norms, and rationality), epistemology (reasoning, the ethics of belief), and philosophy of mind (the nature of our rational powers).
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Lately, I’ve been thinking a lot about the difference between virtue and skill, and how this difference matters for a proper understanding of epistemic and moral achievements (see my papers in PPR and AJP for more on this project).
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In addition, I continue working on issues in philosophy of action, which has been the focus of my PhD dissertation (intentional action, practical knowledge).
Here is my PhilPapers page
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Papers
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“Moral Worth and Skillful Action”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).
On how moral achievements differ from achievements in sports, arts, and crafts. (final version | PhilPapers).
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“In Defense of Constitutivism About Epistemic Normativity”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2022).
On why constitutivism about epistemic normativity is true. (final version | PhilPapers)
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“Is Epistemic Competence a Skill?”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2022).
On why virtue epistemology should indeed be based on virtue, not on skill. (final version | PhilPapers)
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“How Reasoning Aims at Truth”, Noûs (2021).
On how to understand theoretical reasoning’s aim-directedness. (final version | PhilPapers)
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“Enkratic Agency”, European Journal of Philosophy (2017).
On how to understand requirements of enkratic rationality. (final version | PhilPapers)
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“Actions and Accidents”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2015).
On deviant causation and why the causal theory of action fails to solve the problem. (final version | PhilPapers)
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“Gute Gründe. Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit der realistischen Auffassung von Handlungsgründen”, in: J. Kertscher, J. Müller (eds.), Lebensform und Praxisform (2015).
Some (in retrospect: very premature) reflections on normative reasons.
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“Handlungen, Absichten und praktisches Wissen”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie (2013).
On why (and how) to understand intentional action in terms of practical knowledge. (final version | PhilPapers)
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“Schwerpunkt: Praktisches Wissen” (co-authored with Andrea Kern), Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie (2013).
A short intro to our special issue. (final version)
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“Practical Knowledge”, in: T. Spitzley, M. Holtje, W. Spohn (eds.): What may we believe? What ought we to do? (2013).
On why the knowledge of one's own intentional actions must be practical knowledge (not observational or inferential knowledge).
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Book
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Absichtliches Handeln, Paderborn: Mentis Verlag. 2012.
In this book (basically my PhD thesis), I offer an account of intentional action in terms of practical knowledge. (book)
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Edited volumes
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“Agency and Rationality” (co-edited with Sergio Tenenbaum), special issue for Manuscrito, 41(4), 2018. (issue)
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“Praktisches Wissen” (co-edited with Andrea Kern), special issue for Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 61(3), 2013. (issue)
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Work in progress
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Please feel free to email me for drafts. Some of these papers are under review, so I have removed their titles:
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A paper arguing for a virtue-based account of epistemic rationality.
A paper defending the distinctness of virtue.
A paper on Sosa’s view of competence.
A paper on the relationship between moral and epistemic virtue.